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HILE waiting to determine the Texas Legislature's 1997
/ choices for tax reform, taxpayers found both victory and defeat
in judicial and comptroller decisions.
I. SALES TAX
A. APPLICATION OF THE TAX
Particularly notable during the Survey period were the significant tax-
payer victories at the courthouse that successfully challenged aspects of
the manufacturing exemption.' In Sharp v. Tyler Pipe Industries,2 the
* B.A., Loyola University; M.A., University of Dallas; J.D., Southern Methodist
University. Partner, Hughes & Luce, L.L.P., Dallas, Texas.
** B.B.A., J.D., Baylor University. Partner, Hughes & Luce, L.L.P., Dallas, Texas.
*** B.B.A., J.D., LL.M. Taxation, Southern Methodist University. Attorney at Law,
Hughes & Luce, L.L.P., Dallas, Texas.
1. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.318 (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 1997).
2. 919 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. App.-Austin 1996, writ denied).
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court of appeals reviewed a case involving the "one-step-removed" exclu-
sion to the manufacturing exemption.3 In Tyler Pipe, the taxpayer re-
quested a refund of sales tax paid on certain equipment used to make
sand molds which the taxpayer used in manufacturing cast-iron pipe and
fittings.4 The appeals court characterized the sole issue as whether the
mold-making equipment was "used ... in or during the actual manufac-
turing" as required by Tax Code section 151.318.5 The Comptroller urged
the court to differentiate between "actual manufacturing" and "manufac-
turing," requiring a direct contact with the finished product in order to
qualify as "actual manufacturing" and, thus, be exempt. 6 The court de-
clined to follow the Comptroller's interpretation and determined that be-
cause each sand mold could only be used once, the mold-making
equipment had a direct relationship to the production process. 7 The
court found the production of sand molds by the mold-making equipment
to be an early stage in the actual manufacturing of cast-iron pipe fittings
and therefore qualified for the exemption.8 In reviewing similar exemp-
tions that have been interpreted in other jurisdictions, the court noted
that the Texas statute, unlike a similar statute in Ohio9 on which the
Comptroller relied, does not require that equipment be used "directly" in
manufacturing in order to qualify for exemption. 10 The court held that
Tyler Pipe "conclusively demonstrated that its mold-making equipment is
used in the 'actual manufacturing' of cast-iron pipe and fittings" and thus
was entitled to the sales tax exemption."
In Sharp v. Chevron Chemical Co.,12 taxpayers marked another signifi-
cant victory at the courthouse regarding the intraplant transportation ex-
3. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.318(a)(2) (Vernon 1992) (providing an exemption
for property "used or consumed in or during the actual manufacturing, processing, or
fabrication"). The Comptroller interprets this provision as a restriction on the manufactur-
ing exemption only for equipment used directly in the manufacturing process and in re-
sponse, denied the exemption for equipment used in a process one-step removed from the
actual process.
4. At the administrative level, the judge denied the refund and held that the mold-
making equipment and machinery were one-step removed from the manufacturing process
and, thus, were taxable. See Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 27,971 (Mar. 8, 1993),
1993 Tex. Tax LEXIS 83, at *13. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
Ty~ler Pipe. "Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Sharp, No. 9307993 (126th Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex.,
July 19, 1994).
5. Tyler Pipe, 919 S.W.2d at 159; TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.318 (Vernon 1992).
6. The court examined the legislative intent of the manufacturing exemption and
found that the Comptroller's construction of this issue "would tend to thwart, not further,
the legislature's intent." Tyler Pipe, 919 S.W.2d at 162.
7. Id. at 160.
8. Id.
9. See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5739.01(E)(2) (Baldwin 1996). The Comptroller as-
serted that there exists a split among jurisdictions construing similar statutes between those
states adopting the "integrated plant theory" and those following the "physical change
rule." The court acknowledged the varying interpretations among the states, but for pur-
poses of this case found it was unnecessary to formally adopt the "integrated plant theory."
Tyler Pipe, 919 S.W.2d at 163.
10. Tyler Pipe, 919 S.W.2d at 162.
11. Id. at 163.
12. 924 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. App.-Austin 1996, writ denied).
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clusion to the manufacturing exemption.13 This case centered on
Chevron's purchase of extensive piping for use in the polyethylene manu-
facturing process. The Comptroller conceded that the piping qualified
under the requirements of "actual manufacturing," but argued that the
piping was excluded from the manufacturing exemption as intraplant
transportation. 14 The court concluded that because the Comptroller con-
ceded the piping was necessary to actual manufacturing, the issue was no
longer governed by the rule of strict construction for exemptions; there-
fore, the burden of proof shifted to the Comptroller to prove that the
piping was excluded from the manufacturing exemption as intraplant
transportation.' 5 Though the Comptroller attempted to analogize the pip-
ing to a conveyor belt (which has historically been excluded from exemp-
tion as intraplant transportation), the court found a better analogy was to
view the piping as one part of a large, integrated plant, best characterized
as a single machine.16 As a result, the court held that the piping qualified
under the manufacturing exemption.' 7
In a case considering an exclusion from the sales tax base, the Austin
Court of Appeals, in ADP Credit Corp. v. Sharp,18 examined the meaning
of the statutory term "separately identified" as used in section
151.007(c)(4) of the Tax Code. 19 ADP leased equipment under financing
leases that identified the acquisition cost of the equipment, sales tax,
monthly lease payment, lease term, and purchase price at the end of the
lease term, but the leases did not, as the Comptroller asserted, separately
identify the interest rate or the amount of interest paid. ADP argued that
it had separately identified the interest component and complied with the
statute in that the customer could calculate the amount of interest pay-
13. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.318(c)(2) (Vernon 1992) specifically excludes intra-
plant transportation equipment from the manufacturing exemption. Though there is no
statutory definition of intraplant transportation, numerous comptroller decisions have ad-
dressed what type of equipment qualifies as intraplant transportation. See, e.g., Tex. Comp.
Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 29,287 (Dec. 7, 1992), 1992 Tex. Tax LEXIS 403 (in-line con-
veyors); Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 28,723 (Aug. 31, 1992), 1992 Tex. Tax LEXIS
204 (conveyors in assembly line); Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 28,900 (July 21,
1992), 1992 Tex. Tax LEXIS 212 (cranes, man-lifts and winches); Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts,
Hearing No. 28,700 (July 15, 1992), 1992 Tex. Tax LEXIS 203 (towveyor and conveyor
equipment); Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 19,986 (Jan. 28, 1987), 1987 Tex. Tax
LEXIS 827 (cranes).
14. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.318(c)(2), (g) (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 1997).
15. Chevron Chemical, 924 S.W.2d at 432. The court noted and accepted as reasonable
the Comptroller's definition of intraplant transportation as encompassing any item that has
no other purpose than use for intraplant transportation. Id. The court then held that un-
disputed expert testimony clearly demonstrated that intraplant transportation was not the
sole purpose of the piping at issue in the present case. Id. at 433.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. 921 S.W.2d 490 (Tex. App.-Austin 1996, writ denied).
19. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.007(c)(4) (Vernon 1992) (providing, with respect to
conditional or deferred payment sales, if finance charges are separately identified to a cus-
tomer, then such charges are not included in the sales price and, thus, tax is not due on
such receipts). See also 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.294(d)(7) (West 1996) (providing that
interest charges under a financing lease will be taxable unless the rate of interest or the
actual interest charged is separately stated).
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ments by simple arithmetic because all of the relevant variables were
identified on the face of the lease. However, because ADP's lease con-
tracts did not contain a separate line-item for the interest rate or the in-
terest paid, the court concluded that, based on the plain meaning of the
statue, ADP failed to separately identify the interest component of the
finance leases and, therefore, such charges were subject to sales tax.20
The Comptroller addressed the minimum level of contacts necessary to
establish a nexus with Texas for sales and use tax collection in Decision
34,536.21 In that decision, the taxpayer was a music store that operated a
nationwide mail-order business. The taxpayer argued that although it de-
livered (for free) about half of the purchases by Texas residents by com-
pany truck, these deliveries were de minimis (approximately once a
month), and the taxpayer should not be considered a retailer engaged in
business in Texas under section 151.107 of the Tax Code.2 2 Though recog-
nizing that it is not altogether clear from the United States Supreme
Court's holding in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota,2 3 the administrative law
judge determined that even if the taxpayer's deliveries were less frequent
than once a month, the nexus requirements would still be met.2 4 The
taxpayer's physical presence in the state was held to have been estab-
lished by the delivery of merchandise in company trucks by taxpayer's
personnel.
During the Survey period, the Comptroller addressed numerous tax-
payer issues regarding taxable services. 25 In Decision 29,276, the admin-
istrative law judge rejected the Tax Division's attempt to combine
separate non-taxable and taxable transactions into an overall taxable ser-
vice.26 In that case, the taxpayer provided backhoe services for pipeline
companies to dig up leaking pipelines for inspection or repair (an unre-
lated party performed the taxable repair services). The Tax Division as-
serted that the backhoe services were taxable real property repairs
because the backhoe services were a part of, and were involved in, the
20. ADP Credit Corp., 921 S.W.2d at 493.
21. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 34,536 (May 13, 1996), 1996 Tex. Tax LEXIS
306.
22. See TEx. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.107 (Vernon 1992). The administrative law judge
noted that the taxpayer's contact with Texas also included mailing flyers to Texas residents.
1996 Tex. Tax LEXIS 306, at *12
23. 504 U.S. 298 (1992) (holding that a mail-order business does not need physical
presence in a state in order to permit a state, consistent with due process requirements, to
require the business to collect use tax from its in-state customers, but physical presence in a
state is required for a business to have a substantial nexus with the taxing state as required
by the commerce clause).
24. The administrative law judge found that the taxpayer's activities in Texas were far
above and beyond the mail-order solicitation addressed in the Supreme Court cases of
Quill or National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue. See Quill, 504 U.S. 298;
Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. 753 (1967), overruled in part by Quill, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
25. In Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing Nos. 32,860, 32,861 (Sept. 13, 1996), 1996 Tex.
Tax LEXIS 573, relating to amusement services, the Comptroller confirmed that some ser-
vice or membership benefit must be provided to justify imposition of the sales tax.
26. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 29,276 (Mar. 20, 1996), 1996 Tex. Tax LEXIS
222.
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overall repair of the property.27 The administrative law judge disagreed
with the Tax Division and declined to collapse separate non-taxable serv-
ices performed by unrelated providers with subsequent taxable service
transactions. 28
Telecommunications decisions continue to evidence the Comptroller's
expansive view of telecommunications services. Interestingly, the Tax Di-
vision argues that the statutory reference to "telecommunications serv-
ices" is "clear, unambiguous and unequivocal."'29 For example, Decision
30,078 focused on "data management transfer services and the monthly
flat-rate services" provided by the taxpayer.30 As the taxpayer explained,
the Federal Communications Commission did not regulate the particular
services at issue, and the services were apparently well beyond the types
of services the Texas Legislature had in mind when it transferred tele-
phone services from the gross receipts tax base to the sales tax base in
1985. The administrative law judge concluded, however, that the statu-
tory phrase "now in existence or that may be devised" in Tax Code sec-
tion 151.0103 "does provide compelling evidence that the Legislature
intended to cover a broad spectrum of services performed in the elec-
tronic or electrical transmittal of data as contended by the Tax
Division."31
Several recent interpretations concerning Internet access illustrate the
complexity (and confusion) involved in determining what constitutes tele-
communication services for sales and use tax purposes.32 Letters and in-
formational rulings also contribute to the confusion, especially with
27. The decision noted that the Tax Division was seeking to overturn prior comptroller
decisions that held that the taxability of oilfield services provided by different service prov-
iders should be determined individually. Specifically, the Tax Division was attempting to
rely on the "essence of the transaction" doctrine to argue that a service transaction should
be viewed as a series of inseparable events for tax purposes, so that the respective services
performed by different service providers should be viewed as a single transaction.
28. See also Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 27,967 (Oct. 14, 1992), 1992 Tex. Tax
LEXIS 369 (finding that services provided by backhoe companies and vacuum truck com-
panies, although necessary and essential to the welding services to close taxpayer's pipeline
leaks, were not taxable services).
29. See, e.g., Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 30,078 (Aug. 1, 1996), 1996 Tex. Tax
LEXIS 440, at *15.
30. Id. at *4.
31. Id. at *18; TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.0103 (Vernon 1992). See Ltr.
9605L1409F11, TAX POLIcY NEWS, Sept. 1996, at 4, in which the Comptroller addressed
the application of sales tax to services provided by a taxpayer that manufactured, sold and
monitored a personal security and vehicle-tracking device. The Comptroller found that
installing and monitoring the tracking device was a taxable security service; charges for
information, such as directions or hotel availability were taxable information services; and
activating electronic vehicle locks, horns, or lights were taxable telecommunications serv-
ices if the transmission originated in Texas. See also Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No.
24,610 (Sept. 18, 1989), 1989 Tex. Tax LEXIS 197 (computerized answering services were
taxable telecommunications services); Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 23,449 (Mar.
17, 1989), 1989 Tex. Tax LEXIS 64 (rentals of radio tower repeaters were taxable); Tex.
Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 30,273 (Feb. 28, 1994), 1994 Tex. Tax LEXIS 84 (telegram
and telegraph services were taxable telecommunications services).
32. The taxpayer in Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 32,271 (July 30, 1996), 1996
Tex. Tax LEXIS 410 received at least some relief; the Comptroller waived both penalties
and interest based on a finding that the Comptroller employees had misinformed the tax-
14831997] TAXATION
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respect to changes in policy concerning certain Internet type services and
access charges. 33 The Comptroller recently addressed the application of
sales tax to numerous service fees related to Internet service providers. 34
In the Comptroller's view, providing server space to clients is considered
a taxable data processing service and a monthly service fee, as well as a
set up fee, are treated as services in connection with the provision of data
processing services and, thus, are taxable. 35 In addition, a fee for addi-
tional disk space, charges for scanning photographs and documents and a
secure server fee have also been viewed as taxable data processing.36
Similarly, with respect to an information service company that allows cus-
tomers to directly download information after their credit cards have
been accepted, the Comptroller considers the information to be "picked
up" at the server location, and if that location is in Texas, Texas sales tax
is applicable. 37 In another letter ruling, the Comptroller found that a tax-
payer providing an Internet dating service, which included a data base of
interested persons and charged a fee for individuals to access the data,
was providing a taxable information service.38
During the Survey period the Comptroller addressed several cases
seeking to clarify what qualifies as non-taxable new construction. 39 Deci-
sion 29,731 examined the taxability of work performed on a pipeline.40
The taxpayer operated a common carrier pipeline and entered into a con-
payer, including by providing inaccurate written materials regarding telecommunication
services.
33. E.g., the Comptroller has concluded that for purposes of the Telecommunications
Infrastructure Fund (TIF), services provided by Internet access companies are not tele-
communications services, but are information services; therefore Internet access providers
are not subject to the TIF assessment, but are still subject to sales tax, See Ltr.
9606L1414A06 (June 21, 1996); see also TAX POLicy NEWS, July 1996, at 1. This is a
change in position for the Comptroller, who originally had advised that such services were
subject to the TIF assessment. Internet services providers that have remitted the TIF as-
sessment on such services may request a refund of such amounts. Ltr. 9606L1414A06
(June 21, 1996).
34. See Ltr. 9605L1411A03 (May 22, 1996).
35. Id.
36. Id.; see also Ltr. 9604L1408B01 (Apr. 4, 1996) (charges for providing continuing
education and testing via the Internet are not subject to sales tax; charges by the Internet
service provider for maintaining the web page and any separate charge for processing stu-
dent data is taxable data processing); Ltr. 9602L1396F06 (Feb. 29, 1996) (providing cus-
tomers access to the Internet is a taxable telecommunications service; charges to get
information off the Internet (down load) is a taxable information service; charging fees to
list information on an Internet page is taxable data processing); Ltr. 9512L1386B04 (Dec.
21, 1995) (charge to maintain a customer's advertisement or scan of customer's data is
taxable data processing); Ltr. 9501L1335A01 (Jan. 25, 1995) (charges for advertising space
on the bulletin board are not taxable).
37. Ltr. 9601L1389G04, TAX POLICY NEWS, Nov. 1996, at 3.
38. Ltr. 9610L1436A02, TAX POLICY NEWS, Nov. 1996, at 3. The Comptroller did in-
dicate that customers outside of Texas may give exemption certificates in lieu of the tax on
the service.
39. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.357 (West 1996).
40. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 29,731 (Mar. 20,1996), 1996 Tex. Tax LEXIS
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tract to replace or repair certain sections of the pipeline.41 Observing that
this case was one of first impression, the administrative law judge re-
viewed several comptroller letter responses to taxpayers dealing with sim-
ilar issues, as well as memoranda to comptroller audit employees. Based
on the review of these materials, the administrative law judge determined
that the Comptroller has consistently taken the position that the replace-
ment of portions of an existing underground pipeline by the laying of new
pipe in a new ditch curved to tie into the old pipeline is non-taxable new
construction.42 The administrative law judge held that the taxpayer's
pipeline replacement work constituted new construction of real
property.43
In Decision 31,694,44 the administrative law judge held that replace-
ment of concrete slabs by completely removing the old slabs, leaving
nothing but original dirt and subsoil, and then installing new slabs at the
same physical location is taxable remodeling under Rule 3.357, which de-
fines "remodeling" to include replacement.45 The administrative law
judge also found that the installation of groundbeds, which did not be-
come permanently incorporated into real property, was taxable as real
property replacement, a form of remodeling.46
Decision 32,95647 addressed several new construction issues faced by a
country club. One issue involved construction done on tennis courts.48
41. Most of the replacements of the pipeline sections were done by digging a new ditch
three to ten feet away from the existing pipeline, laying the new replacement pipeline in
the new ditch, taking the old pipeline out of service, uncovering the sections to be replaced,
welding the new replacement sections to the old pipeline sections that were to remain in
service, and then removing the old, replaced pipeline sections and refilling the ditch where
the removed sections had been located.
42. Importantly, the administrative law judge specifically rejected the conclusion of a
1993 comptroller letter response to a taxpayer that a similar service was taxable repair or
remodeling. In fact, the administrative law judge stated that the factual situation presented
in the 1993 letter was "near-identical to that presented in the instant case." 1996 Tex. Tax
LEXIS 221, at *18.
43. Id. at *21.
44. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 31,694 (Mar. 12, 1996), 1996 Tex. Tax LEXIS
212.
45. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.357(a)(8) (West 1996). Because the slabs at issue were
part of a whole surface and represented less than four percent of the total area covered by
concrete, the administrative law judge did not find them to be separate improvements.
1996 Tex Tax LEXIS 212, at *4. In addressing the fact that the replacement involved only
four percent of the whole concrete area, the administrative law judge stated "[hiow much
greater a percent would be required for it to become new construction is not easily an-
swered, except that such a percentage does assuredly exist." Id. at *4-5.
46. 1996 Tex. Tax. LEXIS 212, at *7.
47. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 32,956 (Mar. 6, 1996), 1996 Tex Tax LEXIS
130.
48. The work on the tennis courts was described as follows:
The existing courts were dismantled, leaving only a caliche base and several
inches of asphalt ... ; [slix to twelve inches of sand fill was placed on top of
the old court's surface; [c]ables were placed in the next layer [and] concrete
poured on top...; [four] coat acrylic surface was placed over the cured con-
crete and painted with lines; old fence mesh was placed on fence poles; [and]
new stronger light poles and lights were placed in about the same location as




The administrative law judge addressed the threshold question of
whether the improvement to realty was the entire tennis courts or the
individual parts and concluded that the improvement to realty was to the
entire tennis courts.49 The administrative law judge held that the Tax Di-
vision met its prima facie burden of establishing that the services were
taxable by presenting evidence that the original base of the old tennis
courts was left in place and was part of the base of the new courts, and
that the taxpayer did not present sufficient evidence to prove that the
work was new construction. 50 The taxpayer also had construction work
done on an artificial lake to add some square footage and to surround the
lake with a concrete retaining wall to prevent further erosion and to im-
prove irrigation. The Tax Division asserted that the charges were for tax-
able real property repair and remodeling, and that any charges for new
construction, such as the extra square footage added, were not separately
identified and, thus, the entire charges were presumed to be taxable. The
administrative law judge agreed with the Tax Division that the taxpayer
did not present evidence to prove the percentage of the total charges that
were non-taxable services and, therefore, failed to overcome the pre-
sumption of taxability.51
Another interesting decision that focused on the issue of new construc-
tion addressed work performed on a cable television transmission sys-
tem. 52 The Tax Division argued that the multi-year period required for
building the new system, which was, according to the Tax Division, "func-
tionally no different from the old cable system," could not be new con-
struction.53 As the administrative law judge correctly noted, the Tax
Division's theory would mean that a complete replacement could never
constitute new construction if the improvement remained useable during
progress-at-work. As the judge observed:
The distinction between rendering a structure unusable while it is
being completely replaced and maintaining a level of usefulness by
conducting the work in phases is not articulated as a basis for deter-
mining whether work is repair or remodeling in the statute, the rules
or any hearings decision cited by the Tax Division, and is not sup-
ported by logic. 54
49. Id. at *7.
50. Id. at *9-10.
51. Id. at *15. See Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 29,462 (Jan. 23, 1996), 1996
Tex. Tax LEXIS 66, in which the Comptroller found that the taxpayer's submission of
affidavits, a bid sheet and a building plan were sufficient to support its claim that a portion
of the total charge on a construction contract related to new construction, a non-taxable
service.
52. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 30,764 (July 10, 1996), 1996 Tex. Tax LEXIS
390. The administrative law judge noted that the definition of new construction and re-
modeling in 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.357 (West 1996) are far more helpful when the
subject of the work is a building rather than when the improvements in question are per-
formed on non-building structures, such as the cable television transmission systems at
issue in this decision. 1996 Tex. Tax LEXIS 390, at *11.
53. 1996 Tex. Tax LEXIS 390, at *13.
54. Id. at *14. Although the taxpayer did not prevail on all of the dollars at issue, the
decision is noteworthy for its adoption of a reasonable approach instead of the Tax Divi-
1486 [Vol. 50
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Decision 28,92955 was one of several decisions to address the distinc-
tion between maintenance services and remodeling or repairs. In this de-
cision, the replacement of electrical poles used to hold transmission lines
was taxable as a repair or remodeling of the poles. The administrative
law judge rejected the taxpayer's argument that the replacement of the
poles was the maintenance of real property and thus excluded from sales
tax, on the ground that the services were not performed on a scheduled,
periodic basis as required by the rule.56 In addition, the poles were re-
placed only as needed. The administrative law judge concluded that the
time of replacement was not "scheduled" and that because the replace-
ments were not predictable, they were not "periodic. ' 57 The taxpayer's
claim that the replacement of the poles was non-taxable new construction
was also rejected.58
In a case that overlaps both real property services and burden of proof
issues, Decision 31,605 addressed waste disposal pumping services for car
wash pits, felt pits, oil pits and anti-freeze holding tanks.59 At the conclu-
sion of the oral hearing and original post-hearing submissions, the admin-
istrative law judge held that the services at issue appeared to fall within
comptroller's Rule 3.356(a)(4) definition of garbage or other solid waste
removal.60 Noting that the case was one of first impression, the proposed
decision concluded that the Tax Division had met its prima facie burden
of showing that certain of the petitioner's services constituted taxable real
property services because they involved the removal or collection of
waste resulting from commercial operations.61 However, on taxpayer ex-
ceptions, the administrative law judge considered carefully the taxpayer's
point that the Tax Division had the burden of proving not only that the
solid waste removal was involved, but also that the materials involved
sion's all-or-nothing approach. The Tax Division had insisted that an entire cable system
for a city must be replaced in order for there to be new construction.
55. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 28,929 (Mar. 7, 1996), 1996 Tex. Tax LEXIS
201.
56. Id. at *7. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.357(a)(4) (West 1996) (defining mainte-
nance on real property as "scheduled, periodic work necessary to sustain or support safe,
efficient, continuous operations").
57. 1996 Tex. Tax LEXIS 201, at *7. The administrative law judge recognized that the
taxpayer appeared to have an inspection of the poles on a scheduled or periodic basis, but
only two or three percent of the poles inspected were actually replaced, and the judge
concluded that the rate of replacement did not represent scheduled, periodic maintenance
of the system. Id.
58. Id. at *10. The administrative law judge determined this case was governed by
Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 27,509 (Jan. 20, 1993), 1993 Tex. Tax LEXIS 1, which
held that the transformation of an electrical utility's existing distributing system to a trans-
mission system was a taxable remodeling because the end result was a rebuilt structure
which continued to function as an electrical power line. 1996 Tex. Tax LEXIS 201, at *7.
59. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 31,605 (Aug. 12, 1996), 1996 Tex. Tax LEXIS
433.
60. Id. at *12; 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.356(a)(4) (West 1996).
61. 1996 Tex. Tax LEXIS 433, at *12-13.
1997] 1487
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were not hazardous waste.62 The administrative law judge therefore re-
versed his prior holding and held in favor of the taxpayer in the final
decision.63
As in prior Survey periods, taxpayers are still seeking clarity in the area
of exemptions, including occasional sales. In Decision 33,84864 the tax-
payer argued that its purchase of television broadcasting equipment was
an occasional sale and, thus, exempt from sales tax.65 The taxpayer
claimed that its purchase of the equipment represented a portion of the
seller's sale (through an agent) of the entire operating assets of its busi-
ness to the taxpayer. The administrative law judge found that, based on
the contract language, the taxpayer did not purchase the entire operating
assets of the seller.66
During the Survey period, several comptroller decisions addressed var-
ious aspects of the manufacturing exemption. 67 In Decision 33,975,68 the
Comptroller examined the definition of "processing" under Rule 3.300
relating to manufacturing. 69 This decision involved a taxpayer who
purchased second and third quality fabric materials and transformed the
materials into first quality fabric by inspecting, cutting and removing the
flawed and defective portions.70 The Tax Division argued that the char-
62. This conclusion was based on the definition in Rule 3.356(a)(4) which excludes
from the definition of garbage or other solid waste certain hazardous waste items. 34 TEX.
ADMIN. CODE § 3.354(a)(4) (West 1996).
63. 1996 Tex. Tax LEXIS 433, at *16-19. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 31,689
(Aug. 12, 1996), 1996 Tex. Tax LEXIS 432, is another decision involving real property serv-
ices that focused on a taxpayer's claim that day laborers supplied to work at a customer's
plant were non-taxable temporary help service under TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.057
(Vernon 1992). The administrative law judge concluded that the Tax Division had estab-
lished that the taxpayer was providing (for the most part) taxable real property services
and that the taxpayer did not meet the definition of "temporary service," based, in part, on
the administrative law judge's reference to the Standard Industrial Classification Manual
classifications for employees. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts., Hearing No. 31,689 (Aug. 12, 1996),
1996 Tex. Tax LEXIS 432, at *8-10.
64. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 33,848 (Dec. 29,1995), 1995 Tex. Tax LEXIS
596.
65. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.316(d)(1) (West 1996).
66. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts., Hearing No. 31,689 (Aug. 12, 1996), 1996 Tex. Tax LEXIS
432, at *10-11. The administrative law judge denied the exemption, relying on a provision
in an agreement between the parties that stated the taxpayer was not purchasing the
seller's rights in a certain affiliation agreement, or any other assets of the seller. Id. at *11..
67. See, e.g., Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 32,663 (Mar. 25, 1996), 1996 Tex.
Tax LEXIS 186, in which the Comptroller examined whether certain types of construction
qualified for the manufacturing exemption. The taxpayer, a contractor engaged in highway
construction, argued that silt fences, which were used for erosion control at construction
sites, should be exempt under section 151.318 of the Tax Code and Rule 3.300 of the Ad-
ministrative Code. TEx. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.318 (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 1997); 34 TEX.
ADMIN. CODE § 3.300 (West 1996). In denying the exemption, the administrative law judge
noted that the special rules regarding the taxation of contractors indicates that construction
is not a manufacturing process for sales tax purposes. 1996 Tex. Tax LEXIS 186, at *5.
68. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 33,975 (June 3, 1996), 1996 Tex. Tax LEXIS
364.
69. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.300 (West 1996).
70. See id. § 3.300(a)(10) (defining processing as "[tihe physical application of the
materials and labor necessary to modify or to change the characteristics of tangible per-
sonal property").
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acteristics of the fabric were not changed, but the taxpayer countered that
the fabric was changed from flawed to unflawed. The administrative law
judge agreed with the Tax Division that the taxpayer's operations did not
cause the requisite change in characteristics necessary to constitute
"processing" under the rule.71
The wrapping and packaging functions of the manufacturing process
were examined in a decision that involved a manufacturer of storage
drums who also had a filling operation in which it filled the storage drums
with its customer's products. 72 The taxpayer argued that the manufactur-
ing exemption applied to its filling operation because it was part of the
manufacturing process. The taxpayer's filling operation was held to be a
packaging-only function and not part of its manufacturing process, based
on the fact that the customer retained title to the product and the tax-
payer was not involved in the manufacturing of the product placed in the
drums. In Decision 30,606, 73 a cement manufacturer argued that its
purchase of liquid emulsified asphalt should be exempt pollution control
materials under section 151.318 of the Tax Code and Rule 3.300 of the
Administrative Code.74 The liquid asphalt was used to control dust at the
cement plant. The administrative law judge agreed with the Tax Division
and held that the emulsified asphalt did not qualify for the manufacturing
exemption because it did not become an ingredient or component of the
manufactured cement, nor was it used or consumed during the actual
manufacturing of the cement. 75
In Decision 30,245 the taxpayer claimed an exemption from sales tax
for sales of computer software, which, pursuant to the terms of a contract,
were to be installed at eleven locations outside of Texas.76 The adminis-
trative law judge denied the exemption because the taxpayer did not pro-
vide any documentation which showed the means by which the software
was shipped out of state.77 The Comptroller denied the taxpayer's argu-
71. 1996 Tex. Tax LEXIS 364, at *9. Though recognizing the distinction to be a narrow
one, the administrative law judge found that the characteristics of the fabric were not
changed, and that the fabric did not undergo a chemical process or become a different
product, but retained its identity as fabric. Id. at *12.
72. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 35,024 (May 1, 1996), 1996 Tex. Tax LEXIS
269.
73. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 30,606 (Mar. 1, 1996), 1996 Tex. Tax LEXIS
142.
74. TEx. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.318 (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 1997); 34 TEX. ADMIN.
CODE § 3.300 (West 1996).
75. 1996 Tex. Tax LEXIS 142, at *7. In Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 28,540
(Dec. 30, 1993), 1993 Tex. Tax LEXIS 279, an agreement was reached between the Tax
Division and the taxpayer that resulted in liquid emulsified asphalt being treated as non-
taxable. However, the Tax Division argued that, to the extent the emulsified asphalt was
treated as pollution control materials used in manufacturing, the agreement allowing ex-
emption was in error, and should not control this case. 1996 Tex. Tax LEXIS 142, at *4.
According to the administrative law judge, the Comptroller was not obligated to follow a
prior erroneous decision. Id. at *8.
76. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 30,245 (Jan. 29, 1996), 1996 Tex. Tax LEXIS
65.
77. Id. at *5-6. The judge determined that without proof such as shipping invoices,
there was no proof that customers had not picked up the software within the state, thereby
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ment that certain software was jointly owned and held that a software
transfer was taxable in Decision 32,034.78 The taxpayer had contracted
with two related, new start-up companies to design, develop, and imple-
ment information systems for the companies. Pursuant to consulting
agreements with the companies, the taxpayer designed custom software. 79
Testimony was presented that the taxpayer and the companies jointly
owned undivided interests in the custom software and the tangible assets
of the information systems enterprise; 80 however, the administrative law
judge focused on the consulting agreements, which provided that the tax-
payer alone owns the software and other assets. Based on this analysis,
the administrative law judge held that no jointly owned property existed
for transfer.81 The administrative law judge ruled that the consulting fee
represented consideration for the creation of a software program and the
licensing of a custom software program, both of which are taxable under
Rule 3.308.82
B. REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS
A large number of rule amendments during the Survey period occurred
in part due to amendments made to reflect 1995 statutory changes re-
ported in the previous Survey period83 and in part due to the Comptrol-
ler's efforts to "cleanup" the rules by eliminating and consolidating rules
dealing with similar subject matter.84
completing a taxable sale. Id. at *5. Additionally, the administrative law judge noted that
the taxpayer failed to submit any documentation to establish, by monetary valuation, the
portion of the software system that was installed at the out-of-state locations. Id. at *6.
See also Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 31,836 (Sept. 1, 1995), 1995 Tex. Tax LEXIS
423, at *18 (denying the taxpayer's proposal to prove the percentage of out-of-state sales of
videos used by the taxpayer's employees by allocating, in proportion to the number of
employees located within Texas, to the average number of people employed worldwide).
78. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 32,034 (Jan. 24, 1996), 1996 Tex. Tax LEXIS
62.
79. The consulting agreements granted the companies a perpetual, non-exclusive, roy-
alty-free irrevocable license to use the software; recognized that the taxpayer had the right
to license the software to third parties (a right to license that required written consent of
one of the companies in limited circumstances); and granted the companies a limited stake
in the proceeds from the licensing of the software.
80. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.331 (West 1996).
81. 1996 Tex. Tax LEXIS 62, at *14. The taxpayer also argued that the consulting
agreement represented non-taxable consulting services, an "unrelated service" under the
Comptroller's rule relating to data processing services. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.330
(West 1996).
82. 1996 Tex. Tax LEXIS 62, at *19; 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.308 (West 1996).
83. See Cynthia M. Ohlenforst et al., Taxation, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 49 SMU
L. REV. 1331 (1996) [hereinafter Ohlenforst, 1996 Annual Survey].
84. Many of the rule amendments adopted during the Survey period do not reflect
substantive changes in law or policy, and several of those adopted reflect amendments that
were in proposed form at the close of the prior Survey period, which were subsequently
adopted without significant changes to the proposed versions. See Ohlenforst, 1996 Annual
Survey, supra note 83. Due to the quantity of these changes, many of the amendments not
involving substantive changes will not be discussed in this Survey, but the reader is cau-
tioned to examine closely any existing rules to ensure there has not been a change to such
rule. See, e.g., 20 Tex. Reg. 10368 (1995), adopted 21 Tex. Reg. 1687 (1996) (to be codified
as an amendment to 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.285); 20 Tex. Reg. 8991 (1995), adopted 21
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In response to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Quill,8 5
the Comptroller's rule setting forth seller's and purchaser's sales and use
tax responsibilities was amended to omit all definitions of "engaged in
business" except those requiring a "physical presence" either directly or
through independent representatives in Texas.86 The amended definition
of "engaged in business" excludes the previous provisions relating to the
solicitation of sales of taxable items by means of catalogs, periodicals,
advertising or by print, radio, media, mail, or computer. 87 Added to the
definition is conducting business in this state through employees, agents
or independent contractors. 88 The definition of "seller" was expanded to
include pawnbrokers, storagemen, mechanics, artisans, and others selling
property to enforce a lien.89 A provision was added to Rule 3.286 obli-
gating an out-of-state seller to collect Texas use tax for a period of one
year after the seller ceases to have a physical presence in Texas. 90 The
rule now specifies that contracts, bills, or invoices merely stating that "all
taxes" are included is not specific enough to relieve either party of its tax
responsibilities.91 This provision was implemented by enacting a rebutta-
ble presumption that if tax is not specifically stated, the total amount is
presumed to be the taxable item's sales price without tax included. 92 This
presumption may be overcome by using the seller's records to prove that
sales tax was included. 93
A new rule94 was adopted to clarify when staff leasing services 95 are
subject to Texas sales and use tax. Texas statutes exempt from sales and
Tex. Reg. 601 (1996) (to be codified as an amendment to 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.354);
20 Tex. Reg. 10748 (1995), adopted 21 Tex. Reg. 2472 (1996) (to be codified as an amend-
ment to 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.293).
85. 504 U.S. at 298. In Quill, the Supreme Court held that a North Dakota use tax
requiring certain out-of-state vendors to collect the state's use tax violated the Commerce
Clause.
86. 21 Tex. Reg. 11800 (1996) (to be codified as an amendment to 34 TEX. ADMIN.
CODE § 3.286). The amendment also incorporates numerous legislative changes, including
allowing retailers from the United Mexican States to give resale certificates in lieu of tax
for inventory items, imposing a $50 penalty for failure to file timely returns, and a list of
the criminal penalties for persons who use resale or exemption certificates to evade sales or
use tax, which range from a class C misdemeanor to a second-degree felony. See 34 TEX.
ADMIN. CODE §§ 3.286(b)(2), (i)(2), (g)(2) (West 1996). An additional legislative change is
reflected by replacing the 12% interest rate, compounded monthly, with 12% simple inter-
est. Id. § 3.286(a)(1)(G).
87. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.286(a)(1)(F) (West 1996).
88. Id. § 3.286(a)(1)(G).
89. Id. § 3.286(a)(3).
90. Id. § 3.286(b)(2).
91. Id. § 3.286(d)(3). This provision was added to reflect the Comptroller's current
policy requiring sellers and purchasers to be specific as to the type of taxes included in
contracts that do not separately state an amount of sales or use tax charged.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. 21 Tex. Reg. 4518 (1996), adopted 21 Tex. Reg. 7266 (1996) (to be codified as 34
TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.364).
95. "Staff leasing services" are defined as services performed for a client company by
the staff leasing company's assigned employees, together with personnel management serv-
ices (such as employee benefit and payroll services) performed by the staff leasing com-
pany and related to shared employees. These services must be performed under a written
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use tax a service performed by an employee for an employer in the regu-
lar course of business, within the scope of the employee's duties, and for
which the employee is paid his or her regular wages or salary.96 Under
the rule, sales tax is not due if all of the following conditions are met: (1)
at least seventy-five percent of the assigned employees performing serv-
ices under a staff leasing contract were previously employees of the client
company for a period of at least three months immediately prior to com-
mencement of the contract; (2) none of the assigned employees were em-
ployed previously by the staff leasing company, unless the previous
employment was through a shared employment relationship, or by an en-
tity that previously provided or currently provides taxable services to the
client company; and (3) a shared employment relationship exists between
the client company and the staff leasing company as to the assigned em-
ployees. 97 Numerous exceptions are provided to the general qualification
requirements, including period of operations limitations and expansion of
existing staff leasing contracts.98
Rule 3.322 was amended to implement changes to Tax Code section
151.309,99 which exempts sales, leases, or rentals of taxable items to. a
state or governmental unit that borders Texas, provided that reciprocal
exemptions are allowed. 100 The amendment also clarifies the definitions
of organizations exempt as religious, educational, or charitable. 1°1 Addi-
tionally, the rule amendments reflect that religious, educational, or chari-
table organizations, which qualify for tax exemption by reason of their
federal income tax-exempt status, may conduct two tax-free sales or auc-
tions during a calendar year.102
II. FRANCHISE TAX
A. LIABILITY FOR TAX-DOING BUSINESS IN TEXAS
The court of appeals upheld the constitutionality of the 1991 enactment
of the franchise tax's earned surplus component in General Dynamics
Corp. v. Sharp.10 3 In 1992, General Dynamics recognized almost $1 bil-
contract between the staff leasing company and the client company that provides for a
shared employment relationship as to the assigned employees. Id. § 3.364(a)(6).
96. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.057 (Vernon 1992). A service performed by a
temporary help service for an employer to supplement the employer's existing work force
on a temporary basis is also exempt if the service is normally performed by the employer's
own employees, the employer provides all supplies and equipment necessary, and the help
is under the direct or general supervision of the employer to whom the help is furnished.
34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.356(a)(10) (West 1997). Staff leasing services do not include
work performed by independent contractors. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.364(c) (West
1997).
97. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.364(b).
98. Id. § 3.364(b)(2).
99. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.309(6) (Vernon 1997).
100. 21 Tex. Reg. 8734 (1996) (to be codified as an amendment to 34 TEX. ADMIN.
CODE § 3.322).
101. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.322(b).
102. Id. § 3.322(g); see also TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.310(c) (Vernon 1997).
103. 919 S.W.2d 861 (Tex. App.-Austin 1996, no writ).
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lion of income from the completion of a long-term military aircraft manu-
facturing contract. For federal income tax purposes, General Dynamics
had chosen to use the completed contract method to report its profit.
General Dynamics made several constitutional challenges to the tax on
earned surplus, asserting: (1) that the addition of the earned surplus tax
to the franchise tax statute' °4 was an unconstitutional retroactive income
tax because it was based, in part, on income and receipts recognized prior
to the passage or effective date of the law; and (2) that the single-factor
gross receipts formula violates due process and equal protection, and dis-
criminates against interstate commerce. 105 General Dynamics also ar-
gued that the tax discriminated against the taxpayer because it used the
completed contract method of accounting for federal income tax pur-
poses, violating equal protection and uniform taxation mandates. 10 6
The court of appeals affirmed the district court's summary judgment in
favor of the state. Applying the principle that retroactive laws are uncon-
stitutional only if they impair vested rights, the court found that General
Dynamic's vested rights were not impaired because a taxpayer does not
have a vested right in the continuation of a particular measurement
method for franchise tax.107 In addition, the court stated that a taxing
statute is not retroactive simply because the value of the privilege is mea-
sured by the financial circumstances of the taxpayer in a prior calendar
year;108 a tax on a privilege is prospective as long as it is imposed after its
effective date and at least in part for the privilege of doing business in the
year in which the tax is levied. 09 With respect to the challenge to the
apportionment method, the court determined that to prove a method un-
constitutional, a taxpayer must show that the method has led to a "grossly
distorted result" or is "out of all appropriate proportion" with the per-
centage actually apportioned. 110 The court noted that the disparity for
the taxpayer under the single-factor formula and the three-factor formula
was twenty-eight percent, and this percentage was not sufficient to prove
the single-factor apportionment formula unconstitutional." 1
The taxpayer in Decisions 27,905 and 32,453,112 an out-of-state com-
mon carrier with no certificate of authority in Texas, claimed an exemp-
tion from franchise tax on the basis that all of its activities were involved
in interstate commerce. The taxpayer's primary customer was a related
group of entities engaged in the overnight air freight business. The tax-
104. TEx. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.002(a)(2) (Vernon 1992) (tax on net taxable earned
surplus).
105. General Dynamics, 919 S.W.2d at 864-68.
106. Id. at 864-65.
107. Id. at 866.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 868 (quoting Hans Rees' Sons v. North Carolina, 283 U.S. 123, 135 (1931);
Norfolk & Western Ry. v. Missouri State Tax Comm'n, 390 U.S. 317, 326 (1968)).
111. Id. at 869.




payer operated several airplanes pursuant to subcontracts with related
entities of its customer under which the taxpayer's sole function was to
maintain the airplanes and furnish pilots to fly them. In performance of
these contracts the taxpayer employed six airplane mechanics in Texas to
work only on the airplanes at issue, none of which operated purely intra-
state flights in Texas. In addition, the taxpayer rented small storage areas
at the airport for the mechanics to lock up their tools. The administrative
law judge found that the taxpayer was doing business in Texas and had
nexus for Texas franchise purposes, concluding that the taxpayer was pro-
viding repair and maintenance services in Texas and was renting property
in Texas in support of its services.
B. CALCULATION AND ALLOCATION OF TAXABLE CAPITAL AND
EARNED SURPLUS
1. Deductions from Surplus
In Sharp v. Caterpillar, Inc.,113 the Austin Court of Appeals reversed
the district court judgment that had held in favor of the taxpayer. The
focal issue of this case was whether Caterpillar could deduct from its
franchise tax base an amount for future liability for certain post-retire-
ment employee benefits. In the district court proceedings, Caterpillar
successfully argued that ERISA bars the state from including certain
post-retirement benefit obligations in its taxable capital franchise tax base
and that the accounts at issue were "debt" and thus should be excluded
from taxable surplus in determining Texas franchise tax.114 Caterpillar
also argued that the state's position violated the Texas constitutional
guarantee of equal and uniform taxation. The court of appeals concluded
that, although Caterpillar's future liability for post-retirement benefits
could be statistically predictable with reasonable accuracy, the exact
amount of payments for future years "[could not] be precisely deter-
mined in advance."'1 15 The court therefore concluded that Caterpillar's
liability could not qualify as a debt because it was not a "certain amount
of money, 1" 6 as required by section 171.109(a)(3). 117 The court further
concluded that ERISA did not preempt section 171.109(a)(1) as that stat-
ute "is part of a generally applicable tax scheme that incidentally raises
the costs of doing business for some ERISA plans; therefore, the statute's
connection to ERISA plans is too tenuous, remote, and ephemeral to
warrant preemption."Il 8
With respect to Caterpillar's third point, that section 171.109 is consti-
tutionally infirm both on its face and as applied by the Comptroller in this
particular case, the court concluded that there was a rational basis for
113. 932 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. App.-Austin, 1996, n.w.h.).
114. Id. at 233.
115. Id. at 234.
116. Id. (emphasis in original).
117. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.109(a)(3) (Vernon 1992).
118. Caterpillar, 932 S.W.2d at 239.
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distinguishing the types of accounts deductible under section 171.109 and
the employee benefits at issue in the appeal. 119 The court further noted
that Caterpillar had failed to carry its burden of proof of showing that the
Comptroller's different treatment of deductions was tantamount to differ-
ent treatment of taxpayers. In other words, according to the court, "Cat-
erpillar would have to offer proof that, as applied to a large number of
taxpayers, the liability classification actually resulted in discrimination be-
tween similarly situated taxpayers. '120 As the court pointed out, "[t]he
Comptroller failed ... to conclusively prove ... that the statute was not
applied to a large group of taxpayers in the manner alleged by Caterpil-
lar."1 21 As such, this claim presented a disputed issue of fact that pre-
cluded summary judgment, requiring that the case be remanded to the
district court.
Another case addressing permissible deductions from surplus is Central
Power and Light Co. v. Sharp.'22 The taxpayer in this case, a regulated
utility, argued that it should be allowed to exclude from surplus capital-
ized interest on equity funds for construction projects (AFUDC-eq-
uity), 23 which are taken into account in setting taxpayer's rates. The
taxpayer further argued that the Comptroller's position created a consti-
tutional violation of equal and uniform taxes in that generally accepted
accounting principles (GAAP) required different accounting for regu-
lated and non-regulated companies, and that the legislature unconstitu-
tionally delegated its authority to the Financial Accounting Standards
Board (FASB) by adopting the GAAP standard.' 24 The Austin Court of
Appeals affirmed the district court's summary judgment in favor of the
Comptroller. 25
Decision 29,198126 addressed an issue of first impression, whether a di-
rect charge-off of bad debts that have been written-off for both federal
income tax purposes and financial accounting purposes is a permissible
reduction in taxable surplus. In a rare taxpayer victory in the write-off
context, the administrative law judge held for the taxpayer, stating: "I am
persuaded that this instant case is very nearly what the drafters of the
'write-off provision of Rule 3.405(e)(9) 127 might have had in mind."'1 28
The Tax Division argued that the statute allows surplus to be reduced
only if the write-off represented a permanent decline in value due to spe-
cifically identifiable events. In addition, the Division argued that the tax-
119. See id. at 240.
120. Id. at 241.
121. Id. (emphasis in original).
122. 919 S.W.2d 485 (Tex. App.-Austin 1996) writ denied per curiam, 40 Tex. Sup. Ct.
J. 443 (Tex. 1997).
123. Id. at 488.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 493.
126. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 29,198 (Feb. 13, 1996), 1996 Tex. Tax LEXIS
117.
127. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.405(e)(9) as then in effect; 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE
§ 3.551 (West 1997) replaced this rule.
128. 1996 Tex. Tax LEXIS 117, at *12.
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payer was writing-off accounts because it chose to abandon collection
attempts, not because of a decline in value. The facts established, how-
ever, that the taxpayer wrote-off the exact amounts it found it could not
collect from the debtor; the taxpayer submitted copies of letters from its
collection agency attempting to collect these accounts and letters from
collection agents advising that certain receivables were uncollectible. The
Comptroller agreed specifically with the taxpayer's argument that
"[t]here is no more identifiable event in determining the uncollectibility
of a receivable than the debtor's refusal to pay."'129 The judge distin-
guished earlier Comptroller decisions addressing similar issues by deter-
mining that unlike this case, the earlier cases involved the temporary
write-down of an asset or the write-off of an asset involving a related
party. The administrative law judge also agreed with the taxpayer's argu-
ment that if it had accounted for its uncollectible accounts as estimates by
crediting an allowance for doubtful accounts, a reduction in taxable sur-
plus would be allowed.
Decision 32,728130 involved a taxpayer that was the surviving corpora-
tion of a downstream merger. The taxpayer accounted for its preacquisi-
tion contingencies in accordance with FASB 38 by establishing certain
contingency reserves. The taxpayer argued that by requiring the inclu-
sions in taxable capital surplus of amounts the taxpayer was required to
book by FASB, the Comptroller was levying a tax on fictitious assets not
capable of being used in its business. The Tax Division recognized that
GAAP required the taxpayer to account for its downstream merger by
recognizing certain assets such as "goodwill," but argued successfully that
there was no statutory basis for the exclusion of the reserves and contin-
gency accounts established in accordance with GAAP and, thus, such
amounts were properly included in surplus.
In Decision 33,580,131 the administrative law judge refused to allow a
taxpayer to exclude from surplus the full liability attributable to a district
court judgment when the taxpayer had booked only a portion of the full
liability that year as being a reasonable estimate of its possible losses, in
accordance with GAAP. The taxpayer argued that the additional $568
million that remained unbooked should be excluded from taxable capital
to reflect the economic reality of the court decision and that such exclu-
sion would be consistent with the ruling in State v. Sun Refining & Mar-
keting, Inc. 132 The administrative law judge disagreed with the taxpayer's
reliance on Sun Refining, concluding that the Comptroller had already
agreed to allow the amount accrued on taxpayer's books as a reasonable
estimate of this loss contingency; the judge therefore disallowed the ex-
clusion for the additional amount of the liability which was not accrued in
129. Id. at *8.
130. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 32,728 (Nov. 14, 1995), 1995 Tex. Tax LEXIS
618.
131. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 33,580 (Mar. 6, 1996), 1996 Tex. Tax LEXIS
203.
132. 740 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, writ denied).
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that year.133
In Decision 33,731,134 on the other hand, the taxpayer was permitted to
deduct, as "debt," its litigation reserve for a court judgment from its sur-
plus for 1990. Although the court's original order overstated the amount
of the judgment due to a calculation error, and the amended order of
judgment was not entered until 1991, the taxpayer's reserve (and its
claimed deduction for surplus) were for the correct, lesser amount. The
administrative law judge noted that all remedies for appeal had been ex-
hausted with the denial of certiorari by the United States Supreme Court,
so the taxpayer was obligated to pay the amount at issue.135
Several interesting cases addressed the proper characterization of stock
for franchise tax purposes. In Decision 31,723,136 for example, the ad-
ministrative law judge held that redeemable convertible preferred stock
does not qualify as debt and could not be excluded from surplus in com-
puting a corporation's franchise tax liability. The judge stated that absent
the conversion factor, the stock would facially qualify as debt. However,
the stock did not meet the statutory definition of "debt" because the con-
version factor prevented the taxpayer from knowing what the exact
amount of the future liability would be since the future market price per
share when converted was unknown.
2. Allocating Gross Receipts
Comptroller Hearing No. 33,972,137 a case of first impression, focused
on the method for allocating receipts of a limited partner.138 The tax-
payer corporation, which held a ninety-four percent limited partner inter-
est and a one percent limited partner interest in a limited partnership,
had included its pro rata share of the partnership's gross receipts in both
the numerator and the denominator of the taxpayer's gross receipts cal-
133. Several comptroller decisions during the Survey period held that various reserve
and contingent accounts must be included in surplus. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No.
32,933 (Jan. 10, 1996), 1996 Tex. Tax LEXIS 38, for example, held that reserve accounts
accrued for severance packages must be included in surplus (noting that the reserve ac-
counts did not meet the statutory definition of debt because they were estimated liability
accounts at the time they were accrued; taxpayer did not know how many employees
would choose to accept the severance package and, thus, did not know precisely when or
how much would ultimately be paid out).
134. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 33,731 (Mar. 12, 1996), 1996 Tex. Tax LEXIS
225.
135. Id. at *6-7. The decision also points out that the final, correct order related back to
the date of the original order. Id. at *7.
136. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 31,723 (Feb. 5, 1996), 1996 Tex. Tax LEXIS
87.
137. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 33,972 (May 17, 1996), 1996 Tex. Tax LEXIS
276.
138. It has become increasingly common for businesses to convert to partnership form
for tax savings in Texas as well as in other states. However, taxpayers considering mergers
into limited partnerships should be aware of a 1996 Technical Advice Memorandum issued
by the Internal Revenue Service, Tech. Adv. Mem. 9644003 (Nov. 1, 1996), in which the
Service concluded that the merger of a member of a consolidated group into a limited




culation. The Tax Division argued, however, that the taxpayer should
have based its gross receipts allocation on its net receipts from the part-
nership. The relevant administrative rule, Rule 3.549(e), 139 provides that
a corporation's share of the gross receipts of a partnership may be used as
gross receipts "if allowed as revenue under GAAP."'140
The evidence in the hearing indicated that there are no express GAAP
pronouncements specifically addressing this issue, but that, "pursuant to
industry practice it is GAAP for a corporation to recognize the gross re-
ceipts from a partnership in which it owns a majority partnership interest,
as revenue."
'141
Another decision of note focuses on a situation in which an inter-cor-
porate expense allocation gave rise to gross receipts for franchise tax pur-
poses. The taxpayer in Decision 33,383142 provided various
administrative, management and other services to its parent corporation
and to over forty other related corporations. The expenses at issue were
for services provided by third parties and were allocated among the cor-
porate family based on a three-factor formula which gave equal weight to
sales receipts, payroll costs and property value.
Although recognizing the taxpayer's "practical approach" for treating
such expenses as agency expenses rather than as giving rise to gross re-
ceipts, the decision upholds the Tax Division's "more technical" ap-
proach, concluding that the taxpayer must treat the amounts at issue as
gross receipts.' 43
Decision 30,634'4 involved a Texas taxpayer which sold its products in
about thirty states and shipped its products by common carrier to the out-
of-state locations. The Tax Division asserted that the throw-back rule ap-
plied and that receipts from sales to several states should therefore be
treated as Texas receipts for taxable capital purposes. The taxpayer ar-
gued that it had sales representatives soliciting sales on its behalf in those
states and that such solicitation activities were sufficient to establish a
constitutional nexus with these states; therefore, the throw-back rule was
not applicable. Although the taxpayer presented affidavits and copies of
the contracts with the sales representatives as proof of the required
nexus, the administrative law judge found the taxpayer's proof insuffi-
cient and concluded that the contracts with the sales representatives
139. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.549(e) (West 1996); see also infra note 147 (regarding
Rule 3.549) and accompanying text.
140. TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.549(e)(29)(B) (West 1996).
141. 1996 Tex. Tax LEXIS 276, at *6.
142. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 33,383 (Apr. 4, 1996), 1996 Tex. Tax LEXIS
232.
143. Id. at *12-14. The decision recognizes that the relevant administrative rule, 34
TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.549(e)(22) (West 1996) (treating expense allocations by a corpora-
tion among related corporations, other than allocations of income taxes for consolidated
return purposes, as gross receipts to the parent) by its terms applies to a parent-subsidiary
case-in contrast to the brother-sister corporations in Decision 33,383. The decision, none-
theless, follows the principles of that rule.




merely established that the taxpayer had contracted to solicit sales of its
products in the respective states and did not provide evidence that the
representatives actually solicited sales of taxpayer's products. 145
Several other cases address the circumstances in which a change in de-
preciation methods is allowed; Decision 29,817,146 for example, held ac-
ceptable the taxpayer's change from the units-of-production method of
depreciation to the double-declining-balance method for assets associated
with proven oil and gas properties.
C. REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS
During the Survey period, the Comptroller also drafted and proposed
several new rules, including those with respect to apportionment of re-
ceipts for franchise tax purposes.1 47 These apportionment rules are note-
worthy for making explicit the Comptroller's current interpretation of
Texas law on the sourcing of receipts from partnerships and trusts.
As amended, the rule dealing with apportionment of taxable capital1 48
provides that the legal domicile of a partnership or trust is the principal
place of business of the partnership or trust. Principal place of business
for these entities is described as "the location of its day-to-day opera-
tions. 1 49 If the day-to-day operations are conducted equally or fairly
evenly in more than one state, the principal place of business is the com-
mercial domicile. 150 "Commercial domicile" continues to be defined as
"[t]he principal place from which the trade or business of the entity is
directed."' 51 In another trust-related provision, the amendments to the
rule provide that "[d]istributions to the beneficiaries of a trust are appor-
tioned based on the legal domicile of the trust.' 52
Additional changes to the rule include the provision that "a corpora-
tion is required to use the same accounting methods in computing gross
receipts as it uses in computing surplus,"'1 53 and that "[l]itigation awards
are apportioned to the legal domicile of the payor of the proceeds pro-
vided that a litigation award for receipts that are otherwise subject to a
145. The Tax Division contended that it would not recognize nexus evidenced only by
affidavit, and the administrative law judge agreed that additional documentary evidence of
its contract was necessary to prove the requisite nexus.
146. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 29,817 (Mar. 8, 1996), 1996 Tex. Tax LEXIS
197.
147. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.549 (West 1996) (taxable capital) & § 3.557 (West
1997) (earned surplus). The Comptroller had originally planned to propose the taxable
capital and earned surplus rules at the same time, but he delayed the earned surplus rule,
pending a franchise tax hearing on the throwback rule, TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.1032
(Vernon 1997), as it applies to earned surplus.
148. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.549(b)(6) (West 1996).
149. Id.
150. Id. These changes were proposed July 26, 1996, 21 Tex. Reg. 7019, and adopted
shortly after the close of the Survey period. See 21 Tex. Reg. 11511 (1996), in substantively
the same form as they were proposed.
151. 34 TEX. ADMIN CODE § 3.549(b)(2) (West 1996).
152. Id. § 3.549(e)(47).
153. Id. § 3.549(d)(10).
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specific apportionment rule is subject to the specific rule."'1 54 Other
changes to the rule address revenue from intangibles and from natural
gas production. 155
Although the Comptroller circulated a draft version of Rule 3.557156 in
May 1996, as of the end of the Survey period, he had not yet adopted in
final form the rule for apportionment of earned surplus.
Another rule focusing on earned surplus computation, Rule 3.555,157
now provides that a business loss is computed after apportionment and
allocation' 58 and that a corporation may not, even by merger, transfer a
business loss to another entity.159 The Comptroller also drafted and
adopted other new rules, including new Rule 3.576.160 This rule, which by
its terms applies to reports originally due on or after January 1, 1994,
includes a presumption that income is unitary. Factors in determining
whether income is considered unitary are "centralization of management,
functional integration, and economies of scale.' 161 The rule also specifi-
cally provides that income may only be allocated when it "is in the nature
of an investment, rather than operational,"'1 62 and provides that non-uni-
tary income (with the exception of dividends and interest) will be "allo-
cated to Texas net of related expenses, rather than apportioned, if Texas
is the corporation's commercial domicile."'1 63 As long as Texas does not
adopt a combined, consolidated, or unitary taxing mechanism, many
Texas taxpayers have little incentive to rebut the unitary presumption. 64
However, if Texas adopts a tax on unitary income, taxpayers may regret a
strong statutory presumption. 165
154. Id. § 3.549(e)(26). As the preamble to the proposed rule notes, the changes to the
rule are based in large part on litigation involving Pennzoil; the preamble also points out
that the impact of this franchise tax loss revenue is included in the Comptroller's Septem-
ber 1995 certification revenue estimate. 21 Tex. Reg. 7021.
155. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.549(f) (West 1996).
156. To be codified as 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.557.
157. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.555 (West 1997).
158. Id. § (g)(1, 2).
159. Id. § (q)(3). This rule also includes conforming changes to reflect the Texas Tax
Code references to the Internal Revenue Code, id. § (b)(4), as well as certain other
changes.
160. 21 Tex. Reg. 2204 (1996), adopted 21 Tex. Reg. 6896 (1996) (codified at 34 TEX.
ADMIN. CODE § 3.576).
161. 21 Tex. Reg. 2204 (1996) adopted 21 Tex. Reg. 6896 (1996) (codified at 34 TEX
ADMIN. CODE § 3.576(b)).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. General Motors commented on the proposed rule, suggesting that the Comptroller
lacks authority to create a presumption that all income is unitary. 21 Tex. Reg. 6896
(1996).
165. There are relatively few Texas administrative decisions focusing on unitary issues,
although the Comptroller occasionally faces the issues. See, e.g., Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts,
Hearing No. 35,066 (June 3, 1996), 1996 Tex. Tax LEXIS 361 (refusing to hold that the
unitary business principle is a constitutional limitation on the state's power to impose a
franchise tax on the taxable capital of a corporation); Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No.
32,347 (Aug. 19, 1996) 1996 Tex. Tax LEXIS 429 (taxpayer's investments in non-unitary
subsidiaries may not be excluded from taxable capital).
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III. PROPERTY TAX
A. APPLICATION OF TAX/EXEMPTIONS
During the Survey period, the Attorney General addressed whether a
county that leases property from a private entity pursuant to a lease-
purchase agreement is the owner of the property for property tax pur-
poses even though legal title is held in the name of the private lessor. 166
The lease-purchase agreement provided that the county (lessee) would
acquire title to the leased property upon payment of the concluding
rental payment. 167 The county desired to be the owner of the leased
property for ad valorem tax purposes in order to claim that the property
is exempt from taxes under the public property exemption. 168 Given that
property taxes are generally the owner's responsibility, 169 the owner must
be a government entity in order for the public property exemption to
apply. 170 The Attorney General refused to answer the question of
whether the county is the owner of the leased property for ad valorem tax
purposes given that the issue is one of fact rather than law;17 1 however,
the Attorney General did provide some guidance concerning circum-
stances under which a party that does not hold legal title to property may
be treated as the owner for property tax purposes. The Attorney General
concluded that case law appears to provide that a governmental body
holding equitable title to property, even if it does not hold legal title, will
be treated as the owner of the property for ad valorem tax purposes. 172
The Attorney General stated that a governmental entity holds equitable
title to property if (a) the entity possesses the property without having
legal title and (b) if the entity may acquire legal title upon its perform-
ance of specified conditions. 173 In this regard, the Attorney General indi-
cates that case law distinguishes between arrangements in which the
government entity may take legal title to the property only upon the per-
formance of actions by the legal title holder and arrangements in which
the government entity takes legal title to the property upon performing
specified conditions, thereby compelling the legal title holder to convey
title.174 The Attorney General noted that the presence of a trustee in a
transaction (presumably to handle transfers of legal title upon the occur-
rence of specified events) appears to increase the likelihood that a non-
166. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. DM-383 (1996).
167. Id. at 1.
168. Id. at 2.
169. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 32.07 (Vernon Supp. 1997). If, however, the owner is
exempt from property taxes, the lessee is taxable on its leasehold interest, subject to cer-
tain exceptions. Id. § 25.07. However, the property tax on a leasehold interest is generally
far less than the tax on the fee interest. See id. § 23.13.
170. Id. § 11.11(a) (Vernon 1992).
171. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. DM-383 (1996) (citing Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. Nos. DM-98
(1992) at 3, H-56 (1973) at 3, and M-187 (1968) at 3).
172. Id. at 3-4.
173. Id. at 4.
174. Id. at 6-7 (citing Tarrant County Water Supply Corp. v. Hurst-Euless-Bedford In-
dep. Sch. Dist., 391 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
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legal title holder would be viewed as the equitable owner. 175
The Attorney General's analysis of this issue, as well as that of the
courts, raises some planning possibilities. By focusing solely on whether
the lessor in a lease transaction is required to transfer legal title to the
lessee upon the lessee's performance of specified conditions, parties pre-
sumably could affect the ownership of property for property tax purposes
merely by including in the lease specified conditions the lessee could ful-
fill in order to acquire ownership in the property after the lease term. It
is unclear, based on the Attorney General's opinion, whether part of the
analysis concerning the identity of the owner of the property for property
tax purposes focuses on the likelihood that the lessee's conditions will be
met. 176 In addition, if the parties intend for the lessor to be the owner for
property tax purposes but it is desired for the lease to be structured as a
capital lease (or non-true lease for federal income tax purposes), the
question arises whether the parties could achieve this objective merely by
not including provisions in the lease which direct the lessor to transfer
title to the lessee at the end of the lease. 177
The Texas Supreme Court, in Nootsie, Ltd. v. Williamson County Ap-
praisal District,178 held that the special appraisal of land used primarily as
an ecological laboratory is constitutional, 179 and that appraisal districts
have standing to challenge the constitutionality of a tax statute they are
required to implement.' 80 In this case, the taxpayer owned land which
qualified for special appraisal as open-space land under section 23.52181
because it was primarily used by several universities as an ecological labo-
ratory.' 82 Section 23.51(1), which defines qualified open-space land, in-
cludes land used principally as an ecological laboratory for a college or
university. 83 The appraisal district denied the taxpayer's application for
special appraisal because of its belief that the special appraisal for ecolog-
ical laboratories exceeded the breadth of Article VIII, section 1-d-l(a) of
the Texas Constitution, 84 which authorizes the Texas Legislature to allow
175. Op. Att'y Gen. No. DM-383 (1996) at 4.
176. For example, if one of the specific conditions the lessee must satisfy in order to
take legal title to the property is to pay a fixed purchase price which is equal to or in excess
of the expected fair market value of the leased equipment on the purchase option date (as
opposed to a nominal purchase option price), it does not seem appropriate that the lessee
should necessarily be treated as the equitable owner of the leased property merely because
the lessee's performance of specific conditions will result in the lessee acquiring ownership
of the leased property after the lease term.
177. It is also unclear whether the concept of equitable title also applies to a lease
between two private parties, although logic dictates that the tests for determining owner-
ship of leased property for property tax purposes should not depend on whether one of the
parties to the lease is a governmental entity.
178. 925 S.W.2d 659 (Tex. 1996).
179. Id. at 662.
180. Id. at 663.
181. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 23.52 (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 1997). Qualified open-space
land is valued for property tax purposes based on its productive capacity rather than its
market value. Id.
182. Nootsie, 925 S.W.2d at 661.
183. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 23.51(1) (Vernon 1992).
184. TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 1-d-l(a).
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for special appraisal of land devoted to farm or ranch purposes or timber
production.185 In rejecting the appraisal district's position, the court re-
lied on the rule of construction that the legislature's interpretation of a
constitutional provision should be given great weight and that, in the case
of ambiguity, the legislature's interpretation should prevail.186 In this
case, the court reasoned that the reference to "farm and ranch purposes"
in the constitutional provision should not be interpreted to mean only
traditional farming and ranching, but that any use which furthers farming
or ranching could fit within the parameters of the constitutional
provision. 187
The court also held that the appraisal district had standing to challenge
the exemption on constitutional grounds because it was charged with im-
plementing the statute which it believed was unconstitutional, thereby af-
fording the appraisal district a sufficient stake in the controversy at
issue. 188 The taxpayer argued unsuccessfully that the appraisal district, as
a political subdivision, had no vested rights protected by the
constitution. 189
In Dallas Central Appraisal District v. Tech Data Corp.190 the Dallas
Court of Appeals held that computer application software is intangible
personal property and, thus, is not subject to property tax.19' The ap-
praisal district had taxed the property and the taxpayer protested, chal-
lenging that the software was intangible personal property. Although the
Texas Constitution gives the Texas Legislature the authority to tax intan-
gible property,' 92 the only intangible property taxed under the Tax Code
is intangible property of a transportation business, and certain intangible
property held by certain insurance companies and savings and loans.193
In its motion for summary judgment, the taxpayer submitted an affidavit
of its controller which explained that the software at issue is intellectual
property consisting of imperceivable "binary instructions, programs, rou-
tines, and symbolic mathematical code," which is not required to be pack-
aged in tangible form.194 Based on this affidavit, which was
uncontroverted at the trial level, the trial court granted the taxpayer's
motion for summary judgment. 195 The court agreed, relying in part on
185. Id.
186. Nootsie, 925 S.W.2d at 663 (citing Mumme v. Marrs, 40 S.W.2d 31, 35 (Tex. 1931)).
187. Id. at 663. The court was also persuaded by the fact that the appraisal district had
granted the special appraisal for 11 years before abruptly deciding to challenge it on consti-
tutional grounds. Id.
In a compelling dissent on this issue, Justice Gonzalez argued that voters ratifying Arti-
cle VIII, section 1-d-1 of the Texas Constitution had no idea that property with only indi-
rect agricultural purposes, such as laboratories, would be eligible for special appraisal
under this constitutional provision. Id. at 664 (J. Gonzalez, concurring and dissenting).
188. Id. at 662-63.
189. Id. at 662.
190. 930 S.W.2d 119 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1996, writ requested).
191. Id. at 123.
192. TEx. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(c).
193. TEx. TAx CODE ANN. § 11.02(b) (Vernon 1992).
194. Tech Data, 930 S.W.2d at 122.
195. Id, at 120.
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First National Bank v. Bullock,196 in which the Austin Court of Appeals
held that computer application software is intangible personal property
for Texas sales tax purposes. 197
The Texas Supreme Court in Enron Corp. v. Spring Independent
School District'98 held that the use of alternative valuation dates for in-
ventory under section 23.12(f) of the Tax Code' 99 is constitutional, 200 re-
versing the Harris County Court of Appeals.201 Section 23.12(f) allows
owners of inventory to elect to have their inventory appraised as of Sep-
tember 1 of the year preceding the tax year rather than on January 1 of
the current tax year.202 The lower court held that section 23.12(f) violates
principles of equality and uniformity in the Texas Constitution because
the statute treats inventory differently from non-inventory without having
a rational basis for the dissimilar treatment, and that the section violates
the constitutional requirement that property not be exempted without
constitutional authority because property added after September 1, but
before January 1, is effectively exempted from the tax for the year with-
out constitutional permission.20 3
The Texas Supreme Court disagreed. With respect to the equal and
uniform requirement, the court stated that exact equality and uniformity
is unattainable, and that a reasonable discrepancy between the actual
value of property and its assessed value is permissible.204 While inven-
tory cannot be taxed at a different rate than non-inventory, the court con-
cluded that it is reasonable, and not a violation of the equal and uniform
requirement, to require or to allow inventory to be valued as of a differ-
ent date than other types of property.205 Indeed, given the possibility
that inventory may fluctuate in value more than other property, the court
reasoned that the legislature could reasonably have concluded that multi-
ple assessment dates for inventory would enable assessments to be more
196. 584 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
197. Tech Data, 930 S.W.2d at 123. (But see TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.009 (Vernon
1992) treating a "computer program" as tangible personal property for sales tax purposes.)
The appraisal district also asserted that software is taxable as business inventory under
section 23.12 of the Tax Code, arguing that section 23.12 taxes all business inventory. Id.
This argument borders on being ludicrous given that section 23.12 merely addresses the
procedures for appraising inventory that is taxable under section 11.02. Given that section
11.02(b) excludes from taxation all intangible personal property other than certain limited
categories, it is evident that not all business inventory is taxed. Tech Data, 930 S.W.2d at
124.
198. 922 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. 1996).
199. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 23.12(f) (Vernon 1992).
200. Enron, 922 S.W.2d at 939. See also H.E. Butt Grocery Co. v. Jefferson County
Appraisal Dist., 922 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. 1996) (similar holding as in Enron; also holding that
a taxpayer can claim the special valuation date on inventory that did not exist on Septem-
ber 1 but that did exist on January 1).
201. See Spring Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Enron Corp., 889 S.W.2d 562 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1994), rev'd 922 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. 1996).
202. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 23.12(f) (Vernon 1992).
203. Spring Indep. Sch. Dist., 889 S.W.2d at 568.
204. Enron, 922 S.W.2d at 935.
205. Id. at 936.
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reflective of fair market value.206 With respect to the requirement that
no exemption be granted without constitutional authority, the court rea-
soned that an exemption did not exist merely because the valuation date
would affect which property was taxed in a particular year. Rather, the
fixing of any tax date would result in certain property escaping tax had
another valuation date been used.207
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals, in Resolution Trust Corp. v. Tarrant
County Appraisal District,208 held that the Resolution Trust Corporation
(RTC) is immune from agricultural rollback taxes.209 The doctrine of
sovereign immunity exempts agencies of the United States from liability
for punitive fines or assessments absent express congressional authoriza-
tion.210 However, pursuant to section 1441a(g) of the Financial Institu-
tions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA),211
Congress waived immunity for real estate taxes owed by the RTC.212
Therefore, the court was required to determine whether rollback taxes
are covered by the waiver set forth in FIRREA. The court first deter-
mined that section 1441a(g) of FIRREA does not waive the RTC's immu-
nity from penalty real estate taxes, reasoning that the waiver in section
1441a(g) should be construed strictly in favor of immunity against penalty
taxes. 21 3 The court then concluded that rollback taxes are penalty taxes
because of (a) the reference in the relevant statute to the imposition of
"sanctions" in furtherance of the agricultural exemption and (b) the ref-
erence in the former Texas Property Tax Board's Agricultural Manual to
the rollback tax as a penalty for taking land out of agricultural
production.214
B. PROCEDURE
In Central Appraisal District of Rockwall County v. Lall,215 the Texas
Supreme Court held that Tax Code section 42.08(b), 216 which provides
that a taxpayer forfeits its right to a judicial review of a property tax as-
sessment if the taxpayer fails to pay, before the delinquency date, the
greater of (1) the amount of taxes not in dispute, or (2) the amount of
206. Id. at 940.
207. Id at 940-41.
208. 926 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1996, no writ).
209. Id. at 805. Rollback taxes for open-space land are imposed wherever the use of
the land changes from that satisfying the definition of qualified open-space. TEX. TAX
CODE ANN. § 23.55(a) (Vernon 1992). The rollback tax equals the difference between the
taxes imposed on the land for the five years immediately preceding the year in which the
change in use occurs had the land been taxed based on market value versus the tax based
on special appraisal as open-space land, with interest from the original due date for each
year at seven percent per year. Id.
210. Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Ault, 256 U.S. 554 (1921).
211. 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(g) (Supp. 1997).
212. Tarrant County Appraisal Dist., 926 S.W.2d at 805.
213. Id at 802-03.
214. Id. at 804.
215. 924 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. 1996).
216. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.08(b) (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 1997).
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taxes imposed on the property for the preceding year, is unconstitutional
only as to the second prong of the payment requirement. 217 The Dallas
Court of Appeals had ruled that section 42.08 was unconstitutional in its
entirety.218 The constitutional provision at issue is Article I, section 13 of
the Texas Constitution, 219 which guarantees the right to open courts.220
The court reasoned that the first prong does not violate the open courts
guarantee because it is reasonable to require solvent taxpayers to pay
their undisputed taxes timely so that the taxing authorities may have a
steady revenue stream. 221 The court concludes, however, that the second
prong has no such legitimate purpose.222 The appraisal districts asserted
that failure to require taxpayers to pay an amount at least equal to last
year's tax on the property would prevent them from providing essential
services. However, given that this requirement had been in the law for
only the last 14 years, and that taxing jurisdictions did not suffer financial
collapse before then, the court found that the warnings of financial col-
lapse were unjustified.223 Without a sufficient legislative purpose for the
requirement, the court concluded that the second prong unreasonably in-
terfered with an individual's right of access to the courts.224 The ap-
praisal districts also argued that the exception in section 42.08 for
indigent taxpayers should thwart any challenge to section 42.08 under the
open courts guarantee.225 In Lall, the taxpayers did not assert that they
were financially unable to prepay their taxes. Relying on earlier cases,
the court held that the guarantee of open courts should not depend on
the amount of a taxpayer's assets.226
217. Lall, 924 S.W.2d at 690.
218. W. V. Grant Evangelistic Ass'n v. Dallas Central Appraisal Dist., 900 S.W.2d 789
(Tex. App.-Dallas 1995), modified and remanded, Central Appraisal Dist. of Rockwall
County v. Lall, 924 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. 1996).
219. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13. This provision has been interpreted to include three con-
stitutional guarantees: (1) courts must actually be open and operating; (2) the legislature
cannot impede access to the courts through unreasonable financial barriers; (3) the legisla-
ture may not abrogate well-established common-law causes of action unless the reason for
its action outweighs the litigants' constitutional right of address. See Texas Ass'n of Busi-
ness v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 448 (Tex. 1993).
220. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13.
221. Lall, 924 S.W.2d at 690.
222. Id. at 693.
223. Id. at 692.
224. Id.
225. Id. The forfeiture provision set forth in section 42.08(b) is subject to an exception
for taxpayers who file an oath of inability to pay the taxes at issue if it is determined that
the payment would constitute an unreasonable restraint on the party's right of access to the
courts. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.08(d) (Vernon Supp. 1997).
226. Lail, 924 S.W.2d at 692. In Harris County Appraisal Dist. v. Herrin, 924 S.W.2d
154 (Tex. 1996), the Texas Supreme Court held that failure to tender any amount of taxes
on or before the prepayment date in a circumstance in which the property's value was
being challenged violates section 42.08(b) and results in the taxpayer failing to satisfy the
jurisdictional prerequisites to appealing the appraisal review board's determination of
value. Id. at 155. Although the court reiterated that the second prong of section 42.08(b)
is unconstitutional, the taxpayer is still required to timely pay the amount of taxes not in
dispute (unless the financial inability provisions are satisfied). Id. The court did, however,
remand the case to the trial court to determine whether any special terms and conditions
should be imposed under the facts at hand. Id.
1506 [Vol. 50
As during the last Survey period, there were several decisions concern-
ing motions under section 25.25 of the Tax Code. In Comdisco, Inc. v.
Tarrant County Appraisal District,227 the Fort Worth Court of Appeals
held that section 25.25(c)(1), 228 which allows for motions to change the
appraisal roll due to clerical errors, is applicable under circumstances in
which the taxpayer made a clerical error.229 This decision is in direct con-
flict with the Dallas Court of Appeals' decision in Collin County Ap-
praisal District v. Northeast Dallas Associates230 In Comdisco, the
taxpayer had erroneously listed a computer's value on its rendition form
as $13 million rather than $1.3 million, and thus paid more taxes than it
should have. The error apparently was discovered after the protest pe-
riod; therefore, the taxpayer filed a motion under section 25.25(c) to cor-
rect the tax rolls. Section 25.25(c) provides that at any time before the
end of five years after the beginning of a tax year, the appraisal review
board, on the motion of either the appraisal district or the taxpayer, may
change the appraisal roll to correct, among other matters, clerical errors
that affect a property owner's liability for a tax imposed in that tax
year.231 Section 1.04(18) defines the term "clerical error" as
an error: (A) that is or results from a mistake or failure in writing,
copying, transcribing, entering or retrieving computer data, comput-
ing, or calculating; or (B) that prevents an appraisal roll or a tax roll
from accurately reflecting a finding or determination made by the
chief appraiser, the appraisal review board, or the assessor.232
In Northeast Dallas, the court of appeals, relying on legislative history,
read the word "or" between clauses (A) and (B) as an "and," thus rea-
soning that only clerical errors by the appraisal district, the appraisal re-
view board or the tax assessor fit within the definition of an error.233
However, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals concluded that the statute is
clear on its face, and that interpreting the "or" as an "and" is strained. 234
Furthermore, the court concluded that when a statute is clear on its face,
there is no reason to resort to legislative history.235
In Dallas Central Appraisal District v. Park Stemmons, Ltd.,236 the Dal-
las Court of Appeals held that a property owner could not challenge
under section 25.25(d) of the code 237 the valuation of property it acquired
after January 1 of the relevant tax year if the prior owner (the owner as of
January 1 of the tax year) had already executed a written agreement with
the appraisal district establishing the appraised value of the property for
227. 927 S.W.2d 325 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1996, writ ref'd).
228. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 25.25(c)(1) (Vernon 1992).
229. Comdisco, 927 S.W.2d at 327.
230. 855 S.W.2d 843, 848 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, no writ).
231. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 25.25(c)(1) (Vernon 1992).
232. Id. § 1.04(18) (Vernon 1992).
233. Northeast Dallas, 855 S.W.2d at 848.
234. Comdisco, 927 S.W.2d at 327.
235. Id. (citing Moreno v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 787 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex. 1990)).
236. No. 05-95-00691-CV, 1996 Tex. App. LEXIS 4269 (Tex. App.-Dallas, Sept. 20
1996, n.w.h.) (not designated for publication).
237. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 25.25(d) (Vernon 1992).
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the tax year.238 Pursuant to section 25.25(d), a property owner may file a
motion to correct valuations which exceed the correct appraised value by
more than one-third.239 However, this section may not be used if the
property was the subject of a protest brought by the property owner or if
the appraised value of the property was established as a result of a writ-
ten agreement between the property owner and the appraisal district.240
The taxpayer's position in Park Stemmons was that the reference in the
statute to a written agreement between "the" property owner and the
appraisal district should be interpreted to mean only a written agreement
between the current property owner and the appraisal district. The court
rejected this argument, reasoning that the relevant language does not dis-
tinguish between "the current" property owner and "a previous" prop-
erty owner.241
In Fountain Parkway, Ltd., v. Tarrant Appraisal District,242 the Fort
Worth Court of Appeals held that the forty-five day period set forth in
section 25.25(g) 24 3 to file a suit compelling a change in the tax rolls pursu-
ant to a successful motion under section 25.25 is jurisdictional and
mandatory. 2 " In this case, the suit was filed forty-eight days after receiv-
ing the appraisal review board's orders pursuant to a motion under sec-
tion 25.25(d). The crux of the taxpayer's argument was that section
25.25(g) provides that the taxpayer "within 45 days ... may file suit to
compel the board to order a change in the appraisal roll," 245 but that
there is no provision in section 25.25 providing that failure to meet such
forty-five day period bars any further judicial action. 246 The court re-
jected the taxpayer's logic, reasoning that the time limits for filing suit
under chapter 42 of the Tax Code are jurisdictional and mandatory and
that there is no reason why section 25.25(g) would be construed any
differently.247
IV. OTHER DEVELOPMENTS, INCLUDING STATUTES OF
LIMITATIONS AND PERSONAL LIABILITY
A. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
As during the last Survey period, the courts faced interesting statute of
238. Park Stemmons, 1996 Tex. App. LEXIS 4969, at *2-3.
239. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 25.25(d) (Vernon 1992).
240. Id.
241. Park Stemmons, 1996 Tex. App. LEXIS 4969, at *4. This case distinguishes Jim
Sowell Constr. Co. v. Dallas Cent. Appraisal Dist., 900 S.W.2d 82 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1995,
writ denied), which held that the taxpayer was not barred from utilizing section 25.25(d)
even if it had filed a protest challenging the property's valuation for the relevant tax year if
the protest had been withdrawn. See Ohlenforst, 1996 Annual Survey, supra note 83, at
1358-61 for a discussion of several cases addressing section 25.25(d) (including Jim Sowell).
242. 920 S.W.2d 799 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1996, writ denied).
243. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 25.25(g) (Vernon 1992).
244. Fountain Parkway, 920 S.W.2d at 802.
245. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 22.25(g) (Vernon 1992) (emphasis added).
246. Fountain Parkway, 920 S.W.2d. at 801.
247. Id. at 801-02.
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limitation issues. In Sharp v. IBM,2 48 the Austin Court of Appeals af-
firmed the judgment of the trial court holding that IBM's franchise tax
refund claims were timely filed.24 9 IBM had requested an extension of
the time in which to file its franchise tax report and subsequently filed a
claim for refund within four years of the extended due date for the return.
The Comptroller argued that the extension did not extend the time that
the franchise tax became "due and payable," partly because the taxpayer
is required to pay franchise tax at the time it files its request for exten-
sion. IBM countered that the extension for the return filing date also
extended the due date for payment, or at least the payment of any addi-
tional franchise tax due, until the extended date, and the trial court
agreed. Following a careful analysis of the statutory provisions, the ap-
peals court concluded that the four-year statute of limitations had been
tolled during the more than two-year period during which the administra-
tive claim for refund was pending.250
Another part of the court's discussion focuses on a second claim for
refund that IBM filed. The Comptroller argued that because no denial of
this second claim for refund had been issued, and no motion for rehearing
had been filed with respect to the second refund claim, IBM was not enti-
tled to present its claim for refund to the court. The Comptroller based
this argument on the grounds that IBM had not complied with all the
administrative procedural requirements before reaching court.251 The
court concluded, however, that under the facts of this case, IBM's actions
to place both the first and second claim for refund before the court
"achieve[d] judicial efficiency and prevent[ed] unnecessary waste of judi-
cial resources. '252
B. PERSONAL LIABILITY
The Comptroller issued seven administrative decisions on the same day
concerning the assessment of personal liability against an officer or direc-
tor of a corporation that allegedly collected, but failed to remit sales or
use tax.253 These decisions were issued separately but all contain a sec-
248. 927 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. App-Austin 1996, writ denied).
249. Id. at 795.
250. Id. at 792-93.
251. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 112.151 (Vernon 1992) (requiring, inter alia, that a
taxpayer file a motion for rehearing that has been denied prior to filing suit).
252. IBM, 927 S.W.2d at 795. The case also points out that the state had addressed only
the timeliness of IBM's refund claims in the administrative hearing, and had based its de-
nial of the refund claim solely on that ground. Therefore, the state could not for the first
time dispute at the courthouse the specificity of IBM's motion for rehearing. IBM had,
according to the court, properly identified that it had overpaid its franchise taxes and then
addressed the issue on which the Comptroller had denied its refund request. Id. at 794.
253. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 29,521 (May 23, 1996), 1996 Tex. Tax LEXIS
282; Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 31,968 (May 23,1996), 1996 Tex. Tax LEXIS 285;
Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 31,969 (May 23, 1996), 1996 Tex. Tax LEXIS 284;
Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts Hearing No. 32,093 (May 23, 1996), 1996 Tex. Tax LEXIS 281; Tex.
Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 32,094, 1996 Tex. Tax LEXIS 280; Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts,
Hearing No. 32,110 (May 23, 1996), 1996 Tex. Tax LEXIS 286; 1996 Tex. Comp. Pub.
Acc'ts, Hearing No. 32,669 (May 23, 1996), 1996 Tex. Tax LEXIS 283.
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tion entitled "Notice of Related Cases" that summarizes the different
legal propositions found in these cases. Taken as a group, these decisions
illustrate the Comptroller's standards for personal liability. Generally,
the Notice states that the Comptroller does not have the authority to
make an assessment based on the common law tort of conversion,, but
does have authority to make an assessment based on Tax Code section
111.016254 against an officer or director of a corporation for sales and use
taxes collected but not remitted.2 55 The Tax Division has the burden of
proof in such cases-by clear and convincing evidence.256 With respect to
an accrual method corporate taxpayer, to prove that the corporation col-
lected tax, evidence that the corporation submitted sales and use tax re-
turns showing that the tax was due will not be sufficient proof; likewise,
evidence that an officer or director signed returns showing that tax was
due will not be sufficient, by itself, to prove that the corporation, the of-
ficer, or the director actually collected the amount of tax due shown on
the returns.2 57 With respect to a cash method corporate taxpayer, evi-
dence that the corporation submitted returns showing the amount of tax
due will generally be sufficient proof to establish a prima facie case that
the corporation collected the tax.2 58
A prima facie case of personal liability against an officer or director of
an accrual method corporate taxpayer is made by evidence that an actual
amount of taxes was collected but not remitted, evidence that the officer
or director knew that the taxes were collected but not remitted, and evi-
dence that the officer or director exercised financial control over the cor-
poration to the extent that he or she was in a position either to properly
remit the collected taxes or to divert them for another purpose. 259 With
respect to a cash method corporate taxpayer, prima facie proof of per-
sonal liability generally can be met by evidence that an officer or director
signed returns showing that tax was due and evidence that the officer or
director exercised financial control to the extent that he or she was in a
position either to properly remit the collected taxes or to divert them for
another purpose.2 60 The Notice lists the following six non-exclusive fac-
tors to determine whether an officer or director exercised the requisite
financial control: "[1] preparation of returns; [2] signing returns; [3] au-
thority to write checks on the corporation's ... accounts; [4] authority to
enter into and/or approve contracts on behalf of the corporation; [5] au-
thority to receive and disburse funds on behalf of the corporation; and [6]
an ownership interest in the corporation. ''2 61
In Comptroller Hearing No. 29,521262 (one of the seven decisions re-
254. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 111.016 (Vernon 1992).
255. E.g., 1996 Tex. Tax LEXIS 286, at *7.
256. Id.
257. Id. at *8.
258. Id. at *9.
259. Id. at *8-9.
260. Id. at *9.
261. Id. at *9-10.
262. 1996 Tex. Tax LEXIS 282.
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leased the same day), personal liability was asserted against a corpora-
tion's president for taxes collected and not remitted by the corporation.
The Tax Division asserted two theories to support its contention that the
officer should be held personally liable: first, as a participant in the tort
of conversion, based on Dixon v. State,263 and second, statutory fiduciary
liability under section 111.016 of the Tax Code. 264 The decision examines
Dixon and another appellate case, both of which alleged liability under
section 111.016 and alleged conversion only as an alternative theory, but
both held an officer/director liable for taxes collected but not remitted
based on the tort of conversion; neither case specifically addressed liabil-
ity under section 111.016. The administrative law judge questioned the
Comptroller's authority to assess tax based on common-law conversion
because the Tax Code does not appear to authorize such assessment.
However, the administrative law judge added that the Comptroller is not
prevented from bringing suit against the officer or director based on con-
version. The decision reviews Gary W Clark v. State of Texas and City of
Georgetown, an unpublished Third Circuit decision, in support of the the-
ory that the courts interpret Dixon as standing for the proposition that an
officer can be personally liable under either common-law conversion or
the trust-fund theory.265
Several of these decisions evidence the Comptroller's efforts to collect
tax from individuals when the corporate taxpayer fails to pay.26 6
V. CONCLUSION
The Governor's Task Force, which held public hearings during the Sur-
vey period, considered three possible alternatives for funding property
tax relief: expansion of the existing sales tax, enactment of a broad-based
263. 808 S.W.2d 721 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
264. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 111.016 (Vernon 1992).
265. The administrative law judge noted that Clark was a puzzling case; the court recog-
nized it had expressly declined to decide the earlier cases on the trust-fund theory, noted it
was the corporation that owed a fiduciary duty to the state, and that an officer could none-
theless be held liable for his own tortious conduct. The court then concluded by applying
Dixon to hold the officer liable under the trust-fund theory. 1996 Tex. Tax LEXIS 282, at
*23-24. The administrative law judge ultimately found the officer in this hearing personally
liable for the taxes collected and not remitted and in doing so, specifically held that section
111.016 does not apply only to permitted taxpayers. Id. The administrative law judge fur-
ther concluded that Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 30,186 incorrectly relied on
Dixon for the proposition that the Comptroller can administratively assess tax based on
common law tort theory. Id. at *24.
266, See, e.g., 1996 Tex. Tax LEXIS 284 & 285 (finding individuals with check-writing
authority and authority to disburse corporate funds liable for taxes for the periods for
which the individual signed the returns); 1996 Tex. Tax LEXIS 281 (holding that the Tax
Division, by failing to establish the actual amount of tax received or collected, failed to
meet the burden of proof; there was no evidence whether the corporation used the cash or
accrual method, so the evidence of underpayment of returns did not prove that the re-
ported tax was ever collected); 1996 Tex. Tax LEXIS 280 (determining that the Tax Divi-
sion failed to establish the actual amount of tax received or collected and noting that the
officer/director clearly had some control over corporate finances but that she was not the
only person with such control and other persons could have been responsible for remitting
the correct amount of taxes to the state).
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business-activity tax267 and a gross-receipts tax. At the end of the Survey
period, the gross receipts tax appeared the first casualty of the three,
while sales and business-tax alternatives continued to fuel controversy.
As this Article went to press, the Texas Legislature was once again con-
sidering the possibility of significant tax reform.
267. See Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 34,301 (Sept. 9, 1996) 1996 Tex. Tax
LEXIS 472 (discussion of the Michigan single business tax and the Texas franchise tax).
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